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1 Introduction
Risk management is often seen as a core function of the banking business. Allen and
Santomero (1998, p. 1462) suggest that it becomes more and more a central activity
of banks, but that current theories have noticeably little to say about why risk
management should play such an important role in the activities of intermediaries
at all.1 On p. 1465, they explicate that little is offered as a cogent argument as to
why intermediaries should be the ones offering the services of risk management, and
what value they bring to the activity. Hellwig (1998) sees the need for a systematic
theoretical assessment of the role of financial intermediation in allocating risks in
the economy.
The notion of risk management contains basically two essential aspects, (i) risk
analysis as the cumulation and aggregation of information about distributions and
correlations of risky assets, and (ii) risk controlling as the active structuring and
shaping of a risky portfolio. Especially the knowledge of correlation seems to be im-
portant for risk management in reality, since it is the basis of portfolio management.
A firm can only hedge its risk with financial contracts if it is aware of the correlation
between its own business and traded financial contracts (feasible hedging tools).
Actually, there is a variety of approaches to explaining the existence of financial
intermediaries.2 All these have one characteristic in common. Risk allocation is often
modeled, the acquisition of information about the distribution of random variables
is sometimes modeled, whereas the acquisition of information about the correlation
of random variables typically remains unmodeled. As a result, an important aspect
of risk management is ignored.
One might think that risk management should be an essential ingredient in models
about risk sharing—such as those presented by Allen and Gale (1994). However, risk
analysis rarely plays an explicit role.3 As an example, take the model of Allen and
Gale (1999), which describes a risk sharing problem between an entrepreneur and a
specialist with superior information. The specialist knows the state dependence of
the yield of any asset. Therewith, he knows their distribution and correlations. The
entrepreneur is affected by incomplete information regarding the random variables
of traded securities’ outcomes. He wants to hedge the risk of his random income, but
refrains from engaging on the financial markets because he fears unpleasant surprises.
1 For the present, the terms bank and financial intermediary are used synonymously.
2 Certainly, Diamond (1984) must be mentioned as the seminal article. See also Baltensperger
(1980), Santomero (1984), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Thakor (1995) or Swank (1996)
for overviews. Boot (2000) concentrates on the relationship aspect of banking.
3 One reason is often that correlations of risky assets do not appear, because random variables
are assumed to be independent. Another possible reason is that information about correlation
is publicly accessible, so that no meaningful decision about the acquisition of correlation data
needs to be made.
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The specialist possesses the information the agent needs but cannot credibly convey
it. In a one-period setting, although specialist and entrepreneur can conclude risk
sharing contracts that are favorable for either party, the entrepreneur refuses to do
so. He fears being cheated by the specialist. In a multi-period setting, though, the
specialist would have to expect the termination of the profitable relationship by the
entrepreneur if he cheats. Therefore, he refrains from doing so. He offers a risk
sharing contract that fits the entrepreneur’s needs in the sense that it reduces the
entrepreneur’s risk. The anticipating entrepreneur dares to conclude the contract,
which he needs not necessarily understand—he thus saves information costs.
However, the model of Allen and Gale (1999) contains only aspects of risk control-
ling (the entrepreneur reduces risk by signing the risk sharing contract) but not of
risk analysis (the aggregation of information about correlation is not costly for the
specialist). Hence, the focus of the model is risk sharing, not risk management.
Furthermore, most theoretical approaches view banks as competitors with financial
markets.4 By contrast, empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between
banks and financial markets may not be characterized by competition alone, but
may also comprise cooperative aspects. According to Allen and Santomero (2001),
the importance of banks has decreased only in relation to the importance of the
financial industry. Yet in comparison with GDP, the importance of banks and
financial firms increases. This hypothesis is supported by empirical research carried
out by Scholtens and Wensveen (2000) for US-American markets and by Schmidt
et al. (1999) for French, German and British data. Allen and Gale (1999) conclude
that a change of paradigm lies ahead. The “traditional paradigm” in which banks
and financial markets are seen as competitors needs to be replaced by an “emerging
paradigm” in which banks act as a link between entrepreneurs and financial markets.
In the following, we put forward a model in which risk management is the only
exogenous function of banks: An indebted entrepreneur has access to a risky project.
In the case of low outcomes, he faces costly bankruptcy. Hence he has an incentive to
hedge his risk. However, as he is not a specialist regarding financial markets, he does
not know exactly which contracts to hedge with. This is where the specialist—in the
following called risk analyst (or in short analyst)—plays a role. He can gather the
information the entrepreneur needs: He can acquire information about correlations
of assets, he has the ability of risk analysis. However, because information gathering
is costly and unobservable to the entrepreneur, a principal-agent problem between
entrepreneur and risk analyst emerges. We show that if the risk analyst himself acts
as counterparty for the contracts, and if he grants a loan to the entrepreneur, the
problem is reduced. He thus
4 As an example, Hellwig (1998) discusses whether the risk of an economy should be borne by
banks or directly by markets.
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1. carries out the risk analysis on behalf of the entrepreneur by gathering infor-
mation about the correlation between the entrepreneur’s business and states
of nature,
2. carries out the risk controlling on behalf of the entrepreneur by selling him a
hedging tool that reduces the entrepreneur’s risk,
3. grants a loan to the entrepreneur.
Items 1 and 2 imply that the analyst acts as delegated risk manager. Item 3. is more
subtle. Through a loan, a financial relation between risk analyst and entrepreneur
is created, which in turn alleviates the problem of delegating the risk analysis. The
loan harmonizes the interests of the entrepreneur and of the risk analyst. The
entrepreneur is genuinely interested in avoiding his own bankruptcy. After granting
the loan, the risk analyst bears a counterparty risk and is therefore (more) willing
to help the entrepreneur. Because risk analysis (gathering information about risk),
risk controlling (selling tailor-made contracts to customers) and granting loans are
typical functions of banks, we may call the risk analyst a bank.5 In our model, banks
act as agents who manage risk for the principals, their borrowers (the entrepreneurs).
Because of this financial relation, delegation costs are reduced. Hence banks have
an innate cost advantage when managing and redistributing risk in an economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with a basic
model that does not consider loans between entrepreneur and risk analyst. Section 3
extends the basic model by allowing the risk analyst to grant loans to the customer.
The discussion and conclusion of Section 4 complete the paper.
2 Basic Model—Hedge Contracts Only
2.1 Model Structure and Assumptions
Consider a two date (t = 0, 1) economy with two agents, an entrepreneur and a risk
analyst.6 Both agents are risk neutral. The entrepreneur has debts with face value
K. If he fails to repay in t = 1, he undergoes bankruptcy costs φU. His only asset is
a project with uncertain nonnegative return Y˜ : Ω→ R+, where Ω is the set of states
of nature in t = 1. The entrepreneur is not liable with private means. He knows
5 However, the approach follows the functional approach proposed by Merton and Bodie (1995).
The question answered is whether there are economies of scope between the functions of (del-
egated) risk management and lending.
6 In the following, the index U stands for the entrepreneUr. B stands for the risk analyst because
we want to show that B behaves like a Bank.
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the distribution function of all random variables, e. g. those of financial contracts
and especially that of his own project, F : R → [0, 1]. He does not know the state
dependencies and correlations of random variables, especially not the correlations
between financial contracts and his project.7 In this situation, the entrepreneur may
want to hedge away some of his bankruptcy risk by trading on financial markets,
say by concluding a financial transaction that leads to state contingent payments
Z˜ : Ω→ R which reduces the probability of bankruptcy. However, he cannot assess
which one is the right transaction to conclude.
The risk analyst also knows the distribution functions of random variables, espe-
cially that of the entrepreneur’s project, F . Furthermore, he knows the correlations
between all random variables apart from that of the entrepreneur’s project. By ex-
erting an effort cB, he can even learn these last correlations. Formally, he knows the
state dependencies of the returns of any conceivable financial contract Z˜ : Ω → R,
but not that of the project Y˜ : Ω → R+. In short, the risk analyst lacks only
one bit of information—the state dependency of the project Y˜ . From this infor-
mation, he can derive the correlations between the project and all other financial
contracts. The missing bit of information is accessible to him at costs cB, but not to
the entrepreneur. After gathering the information, the risk analyst may advise the
entrepreneur on which contract to conclude. He may even sell a contract himself.
The generated incentive problem—whether to spend cB and gather information or
not— is analyzed in the following sections. The risk analyst is assumed to dispose
of unlimited capital.
We impose three assumptions on hedge contracts, the financial contracts between
entrepreneur and risk analyst.
1. No payments are made in t = 0. Only in t = 1 payments are swapped.
2. The stipulated payments Z˜ in t = 1 are state contingent. There are no return
contingencies.8 Z˜ can assume positive values—when the entrepreneur is due
to pay—and negative values—when the entrepreneur receives money and the
risk analyst pays.
The following third property of a hedge contract is slightly more complicated.
The entrepreneur knows what he wants—a contract Z˜ that eliminates his entire
7 Note that throughout this paper, the notion of correlation contains all information about the
dependency on two random variables, not only the correlation coefficient ρ. Formally, it is
the copula that contains this information about the correlation of two random variables whose
distributions are known. The copula is the two-dimensional distribution function modulo the
marginals. For a more detailed discussion, cf. Bickel et al. (1993, pp. 155–157) or Paul Em-
brechts and McNeil (2001).
8 Consequently, the contract can be written as a random variable Z˜ : Ω→ R: For every state of
nature ω ∈ Ω, a payment Z˜(ω) is stipulated.
4
bankruptcy risk, hence he would like Y˜ (ω)− Z˜(ω) > K for all ω ∈ Ω. In addition,
assume that entrepreneur and risk analyst agree that in t = 1, the hedge contract
should not lead to more cash payment flows than necessary. Optimally, it then has
the form
Z˜(ω) = min{S, Y˜ (ω)−K} (1)
for some S ∈ R. If the project performs poorly, the entrepreneur wants to be paid
Y˜ − K in order to avert bankruptcy, whereas in case of good performance, he is
willing to pay a “premium” S. However, because the entrepreneur does not know
the state dependencies Y˜ , he cannot check whether a contract Z˜ follows eq. (1).
At least, he can observe the contract’s distribution function, and he knows that a
contract Z˜ as in (1) must have the distribution function
FZ˜(z) =
{
FY˜ (z + K) : z < S,
1 : else.
(2)
Therefore, if he notices that the risk analyst proposes a contract Z˜ which does not
have the distribution as in (2), he infers he does not get what he wants and rejects
the contract. We consequently assume
3. FZ˜ has the form of eq. (2).
Item 3. has one important implication. It involves that from the entrepreneur’s point
of view, any contract can be completely described by one variable S, the “terms”
of the contract. S = 0 means that the contract never stipulates payments from
the entrepreneur to the risk manager. S → ∞ implies that the entrepreneur must
forward all project returns to the risk analyst. The illustration for a hedge contract
Z˜ is a bundle of financial instruments like swaps, futures, forwards and options
depending on exogenous variables such as interest rates, exchange rates, commodity
prices, macroeconomic variables and the like. Item 3. then implies that not more
instruments than necessary are “bought”.
For simplicity, the future is not discounted, the risk free rate is standardized to
zero. Just as well, assume that 0 < F (Y ) < 1 everywhere, and that F is sufficiently
smooth so that the density function f(Y ) = F ′(Y ) exists. The game described so far
is called called Game 1 in the following; its time structure can taken from Figure 1.
In Game 1, the entrepreneur is the first mover, his strategy space is denoted by
σU ∈ {S, † }, where S ∈ R stands for the entrepreneur’s proposal of the hedge
contract’s terms, † for not offering any contract. The analyst is the second mover,
his strategy space is σB ∈ {⊕,, † }, where ⊕ denotes accepting the proposal S
and investing cB (risk-analyzing),  for accepting S but not exerting cB (not risk-
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Figure 1: Time Structure of Game 1 (without Loan)
• t = 0: The entrepreneur “finds” a project and decides on its
realization.
• The entrepreneur decides whether to offer the risk analyst a
hedge contract. If he offers a contract, he chooses its terms
S.
• The analyst decides whether to accept the contract. If he
accepts, he further decides whether to risk-analyze the en-
trepreneur’s project, i. e. to find out the project’s state de-
pendency Y˜ .
• The analyst decides how to draw up the state dependencies
Z˜ of the contract.10
• The entrepreneur signs the contract and carries out the
project.
• t = 1: Nature “chooses” a state ω and with it a project
realization Y˜ (ω) and a contract liability Z˜(ω).
• If possible, payments flow. If Y˜ (ω) − Z˜(ω) < K, the en-
trepreneur files for bankruptcy which leads to costs of φU.
analyzing), † for not accepting the entrepreneur’s proposal.9 At his decision node,
the risk analyst is in a position where he can only reject or accept a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. The entrepreneur is implicitly assumed to possess all the bargaining power.
Let us now discuss the assumptions. The assumption that the entrepreneur is
threatened by bankruptcy is needed to induce some motivation for risk sharing.
Bankruptcy risk is assumed away for the risk analyst to keep the risk sharing prob-
lem as simple as possible.11 The assumption that distributions of random variables
are publicly known directs the scope of the model on correlations, as being the prin-
cipal item of risk management. The assumption that the risk analyst already knows
10 The analyst cannot decide on the terms S which has already been chosen by the entrepreneur.
However, the analyst can select the state dependencies Z˜ for the entrepreneur is unable to
assess them.
9 For a precise definition of game theoretical notions, cf. e. g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
Note that the chosen way of notation contains already some simplification and is not formally
correct. Because the analyst’s move is already a response to the entrepreneur’s move, one
should correctly write σB ∈ {(⊕|S), (|S), ( † |S), ( † | † )}. In order to avoid clutter, we quote
only the moves instead of the whole strategies. Moreover, B’s strategy space is actually richer,
for he might risk-analyze the project but choose to draw up a contract that does not fit the
project.
11 If the risk analyst were affected by bankruptcy risk, he would in turn want to hedge away any
risk generated from the contract with the entrepreneur. By engaging on financial markets, he
would become an actual financial intermediary.
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the correlations between random variables, especially between financial securities,
reflects the idea that there may be someone who has an information advantage on
the financial markets. The assumption that the entrepreneur is completely ignorant
of correlations is, of course, strong. However, it keeps calculations simple. Alterna-
tively, one may assume that the entrepreneur has some information on correlations,
but that this information is already incorporated in the project’s return Y˜ . Prop-
erty 2 of the contract, the assumption that payments are state contingent only, is
crucial for the results. The idea behind is that in reality, return contingencies would
entail moral hazard problems that are not to be modelled here.12 Finally, the time
structure of the model reflects the bargaining power of the agents. The entrepreneur
is unique with his project, whereas there may be several specialists on the financial
markets. In the model, the entrepreneur has the power to confront the risk analyst
with a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
2.2 Sequential Equilibrium
We first calculate the expected profits, depending on the moves chosen by en-
trepreneur and risk analyst.13 That way, the strategic form of Game 1 becomes
known, which simplifies the analysis of equilibrium. The following remark studies
the case that the risk analyst invests in information gathering about the project’s
correlations.14
Remark 1 (Hedge Contract after Risk Analysis) If the risk analyst analyzes
the project (σU = S, σB =⊕), then he draws up a hedge contract, and this contract
fits the project. The entrepreneur’s bankruptcy risk is eliminated.
As derived in the proof, the risk analyst’s expected profits are
E[ΠB](S,⊕) = S −F(S + K)− cB. (3)
where F is the distribution function of Y˜ , and F is its primitive function. The
entrepreneur’s expected profits can be calculated as a residual,
E[ΠU](S,⊕) = E[Y˜ ](S,⊕) − E[Z˜](S,⊕) = E[Y˜ ]− S + F(S + K). (4)
12 A return contingent contract may provide that in case the project performs poorly, the risk
analyst always pays the missing amount to prevent the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy. In this case,
if we assume that the entrepreneur can to a certain degree influence the return of his project
by exerting effort, these effort may be reduced if poor performance becomes foreseeable.
13 In order to keep track of the calculations, we have to define indices for different moves. In the
brackets in the subscript, the first symbol denotes the entrepreneur’s move, the second denotes
the risk analyst’s response.
14 For proofs, cf. the author’s website.
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If the risk analyst does not risk-analyze the entrepreneur’s project, he cannot build
the contract on the project’s state dependencies Y˜ . There are then several possibil-
ities. By chance, the risk analyst may draw up a contract Z˜ with a high correlation
with the fitting (desired) contract. On the other hand, he may also happen to
choose an unfortunate contract Z˜ that stipulates payments from the entrepreneur
when the project’s returns are low, possibly even causing his bankruptcy. The fol-
lowing remark shows that, taking into account all possibilities with their according
probabilities, the assumption that there is a random variable X˜, i. i. d. with Y˜ , on
which the contract is based, leads to correct expected profits.15 As an illustration,
the entrepreneur does not need to take all possible contracts written by the risk
analyst into account: If anticipates the analyst will not analyze the project, he may
assume that the payments of the contracts he gets are stochastically independent of
the contract he wants. Also the contract Z˜ is then stochastically independent from
the project Y˜ .
Remark 2 (The Representative Hedge Contract) Assume that the analyst
draws up a hedge contract without having risk-analyzed the project (σU=S, σB=).
Then the assumption that the contract is based on a random variable X˜ which is
i. i. d. with the project returns Y˜ leads to the correct expected profits.
It is now possible to calculate the expected profits of a contract which is based on
an X˜ which is i. i. d. from Y˜ . The entrepreneur’s limited liability must be taken into
account—the risk analyst can never obtain more than the minimum of the returns
of the project Y and the contract’s claims, min{X −K,S}. We obtain16
E[ΠB](S,) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
min{Y,X −K,S} f(Y ) dY f(X) dX
= S −F(S + K)−
∫ S
0
F (X) (1− F (X + K)) dX. (5)
Again, the entrepreneur’s expected profits can be calculated as a residual, addition-
ally taking into account his positive probability of bankruptcy.
E[ΠU](S,) = E[Y˜ ]− E[ΠB](S,) − E[φU](S,) with (6)
E[φU](S,) = φU Pr{Y − Z < K} = φU Pr{Y < S + K and Y < X}
= φU F (S + K)
(
1− F (S + K)
2
)
,
and E[ΠB](S,) as calculated in (5). Finally, we have to determine the expected
profits of both players for the case that no contract is written.
E[ΠU](S, † ) = E[ΠU]( † , † ) = E[Y˜ ]− φU Pr{Y < K} = E[Y˜ ]− φU F (K). (7)
15 Note that we do not claim that the contract is always independent of the project Y˜ . As
described, good fits are possible as well as bad fits. X˜ is a mere representative with “average
fit” leading to right expectations.
16 For an extensive derivation, cf. the author’s website.
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Table 1: Survey of Expected Profits in Dependence on Selected Moves
Risk Analysis No Risk Analysis No Contract
σ=(S,⊕) σ=(S,) σ=(†, †)
E[ΠB]σ S −F(S + K)− cB S −F(S + K)− ∫ S0 F (X) (1−F (X+K)) dX
0
E[ΠU]σ E[Y˜ ]− S + F(S + K)
E[Y˜ ]− S + F(S + K)
+
∫ S
0 F (X) (1−F (X+K)) dX
−φU F (S+K) 2−F (S+K)2
E[Y˜ ]− φU F (K)
∑
E[Y˜ ]− cB E[Y˜ ]−φU F (S+K) 2−F (S+K)2
E[Y˜ ]− φU F (K)
Note: The table contains the strategic form of Game 1: Expected profits are listed for all possible
moves.
The risk analyst does not participate, which implies E[ΠB](S, † ) = E[ΠB]( † , † ) = 0.
Now the expected profits given the moves of the players are known (cf. Table 1).
When choosing between nonperformance and performance of the risk analysis, the
analyst is confronted with a tradeoff. If he analyzes the project and draws up the fit-
ting contract, he has to spend cB, but faces no counterparty risk—the entrepreneur’s
possible bankruptcy is prevented by the contract. If he draws up a contract with-
out risk-analyzing, he saves cB, but runs the risk that the entrepreneur cannot pay
although intended by contract. As one can see from Table 1, the expected financial
loss due to counterparty risk amounts to κ(S) :=
∫ S
0
F (X) (1 − F (X + K)) dX.
The analyst is indifferent between moves ⊕ and  (and assumed to opt for ⊕) iff
cB = κ(S).
In Figure 2, an example for profit functions is pictured. Here, all three indifference
points exist. The profit function of the entrepreneur jumps at indifference points of
the risk analyst. In sequential equilibrium, the entrepreneur chooses σU = S⊕B∼, the
analyst answers with σB = ⊕, he analyzes the project. The following Proposition 1
states that this is one of four possible types of sequential equilibria.17
Proposition 1 (Categorization of Sequential Equilibria) Depending on the
exogenous parameters F , K, φU and cB, sequential equilibrium σ
∗ = (σ∗U, σ
∗
B) is in
one of the four categories, one of which provides positive expected profits for the
17 In the Appendix (cf. the author’s website), we prove that E[ΠU] is locally non-increasing with
S, which implies that the entrepreneur always proposes an S that leaves the analyst indifferent
between two strategies (Proposition 4). If indifference points exist, they are unique (Remark 5).
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Figure 2: Expected Profits of Risk Analyst and Entrepreneur as a Function of S
S(⊕B∼)S(⊕B∼† )S(B∼† )
E[ΠB](S,)
E[ΠB](S,⊕)
E[ΠB](S, † )
E[ΠB]
S
1
2 4 6
S(⊕B∼)S(⊕B∼† )S(B∼† )
E[ΠU](S,)
E[ΠU](S,⊕)
E[ΠU](S, † )
E[ΠU]
S
©
1
2
2
3
4 6
Note: The figure is based on exponential distribution of Y˜ , thus F (Y ) = 1 − e−Y/µ with µ = 3.
Furthermore, K = 1.5, cB = 0.5, and φU = 5. The entrepreneur’s expected profits are maximized
when the analyst is indifferent between risk-analysis and no risk-analysis (at ‘©’); equilibrium has
the form σ∗2 . Here, B’s expected profits are positive.
risk analyst,
σ∗0 with σ
∗
U = † , σ∗B = † and E[ΠB] = 0;
σ∗1 with σ
∗
U = S(⊕B∼† ), σ
∗
B = ⊕ and E[ΠB] = 0;
σ∗2 with σ
∗
U = S(⊕B∼), σ
∗
B = ⊕ and E[ΠB] > 0; or
σ∗3 with σ
∗
U = S(B∼† ), σ
∗
B =  and E[ΠB] = 0.
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Figure 3: Scope of Sequential Equilibria of Game 1
K
cB
∗
1
1
2
2
3
3
↙ S(⊕B∼† )=∞
↙ S(⊕B∼)=∞
← S(B∼† )=∞
↖ E[ΠU]σ2 = E[ΠU]σ0
E[ΠU]σ2 = E[ΠU]σ1↗
↙ E[ΠU]σ2 = E[ΠU]σ3
Note: Like in Figure 2, Y˜ is exponentially distributed with µ = 3, and φU = 5. Depending on cB
and K, different sequential equilibria are played. Points where σ∗2 (with σ
∗
B = ⊕ and E[ΠB] > 0)
is played are backed dark gray, σ∗1 (with σ
∗
B = ⊕ and E[ΠB] = 0) is backed light gray and σ∗3 is
backed white. Under exponential distribution, σ∗0 is never played. Therefore, demarcation lines
between σ∗0 and other equilibria are not noted. As demonstrated in Figure 2, σ
∗
2 is the equilibrium
when cB = 0.5 and K = 1.5 (’∗’).
Here, the category of σ∗2 contains the sequential equilibrium of Figure 2. There,
a delegation of risk analysis is advantageous for the entrepreneur. However, if he
offered the risk analyst a contract setting the terms S sufficiently low that E[ΠB] = 0,
then the analyst would rather choose not to risk-analyze the project. In order to
create sufficient incentives, the entrepreneur must “raise” S and thus the analyst’s
counterparty risk κ(S) until κ(S) = cB. Under this condition, the analyst examines
the project, draws up the fitting contract, and his expected profits E[ΠB] are positive.
Hence the entrepreneur must “overpay” the analyst for his service.18
18 The mechanism is similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where the lender chooses undesirable
projects if the bank sets interest rates too high.
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By contrast, in σ∗1 the delegation of risk analysis is also favorable for the en-
trepreneur, but an S with E[ΠB] = 0 is sufficient to implement incentives for the risk
analyst to inspect the project.19 In σ∗3, the analyst writes the contract blindfold—
the entrepreneur’s project is never risk-analyzed. Because E[ΠB] = 0 in this case,
the contract leads to a mean preserving spread for the entrepreneur, which in this
case reduces his bankruptcy risk. If the mean preserving spread generated by the
contract cannot reduce the bankruptcy risk, then no contract can be agreed upon
(the case of σ∗0). The scopes of these four classes of equilibria, depending on K and
cB, are represented in Figure 3.
3 A Model with Lending
3.1 Model Structure and Assumptions
We have seen that in some cases, expected profits of the risk analyst are positive,
although he only receives a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Therefore, the entrepreneur may
seek ways to appropriate some of the analyst’s profits. In this section, we analyze
how a loan—as an example for a deeper financial intertwining between entrepreneur
and risk analyst—can be used as an instrument for appropriation. First, we take
the level of debt as given exogenously.
Assume the entrepreneur has already received a loan of the amount l ≥ 0 with
repayment L ≥ 0. L contains redemption and interest. The maturity period is iden-
tical with the project’s life span. The entrepreneur is liable only with the project’s
results. If he does not need l to finance the project, one may imagine that he con-
sumes l directly.20 Because of the additional liabilities of the entrepreneur due to
the loan, the bankruptcy threshold rises from K to K+L. Taking this into account,
a hedge contract must shed the whole, increased risk, it must be based on K + L.
As in Section 2.2, we can now calculate expected profits for the different strategies.
First, assume that the risk analyst has inspected the project and written the fitting
contract (σB = ⊕). Then he receives S (plus L because of the entrepreneur’s
liabilities towards him) only if the project delivers more than S +K +L. Otherwise
he receives the whole output Y less K which he transfers to the entrepreneur in
19 Here, profits are identical to those under symmetric information.
20 Note that the reason for the funding is irrelevant—there need not be a explicit financing
problem. If there is a financing problem, the loan has two effects. It solves the problem and it
has implications on the problem of delegating risk management.
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order to avoid bankruptcy. Thus21
E[ΠB](S,⊕),(L,l) =
∫ S+K+L
0
(Y −K) f(Y ) dY +
∫ ∞
S+K+L
(S + L) f(Y ) dY − cB − l
= S + L−F(S + K + L)− cB − l, and (8)
E[ΠU](S,⊕),(L,l) = E[Y˜ ]− S − L + F(S + K + L) + l. (9)
The same train of thought can be applied to calculate the expected profits for the
other strategies,
E[ΠB](S,),(L,l) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
min{Y,X −K,S + L} f(Y ) dY f(X) dX − l
= S + L−F(S + L)−
∫ S+L
0
F (X) (1− F (X + K)) dX − l. (10)
E[ΠU](S,),(L,l) = E[Y˜ ]− E[ΠB](S,),(L,l) − E[φU](S,),(L,l) with (11)
E[φU](S,),(L,l) = φU Pr{Y −Z < K+L} = φU Pr{Y < S+L+K and Y < X}
= φU F (S + L + K)
(
1− F (S + L + K)
2
)
and E[ΠB]S, as calculated in (10). Furthermore,
E[ΠB]( † , † ),(L,l) = L−F(L)− l,
E[ΠU]( † , † ),(L,l) = E[Y˜ ] + l − L + F(L)− φU F (K + L).
One can now determine how the loan parameters l and L influence the expected
profits of each strategy. Interestingly, in the two cases σB = ⊕ and σB = , S and
L influence the analyst’s profits only through their sum S + L.
Remark 3 (Relocation of Indifference Point) Lending changes the expected
profit curves of the risk analyst so that the indifference point S between analysis
and no analysis is shifted downwards,
E[ΠB](S,⊕),(L,l) = E[ΠB](S+L,⊕),(0,l) and (12)
E[ΠB](S,),(L,l) = E[ΠB](S+L,),(0,l), thus (13)
S(⊕B∼),(L,l) = S(⊕B∼) − L. (14)
Remark 3 has far-reaching consequences on equilibrium. As (14) states, the higher
the entrepreneur’s level of debt at the analyst, the less further incentives (by raising
21 Unfortunately, the expected profits must now be indexed with two more variables, L and l. Note
that E[ΠB](S,⊕),(L=0,l=0) = E[ΠB](S,⊕) and E[ΠU](S,⊕),(L=0,l=0) = E[ΠU](S,⊕), for L = l = 0
means that no loan exits. The same applies for E[ΠB](S,),E[ΠU](S,), and so forth.
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Figure 4: Time Structure of the Game 2 (with Loan)
• t = 0: The entrepreneur “finds” a project and decides on its
realization.
• The entrepreneur applies for a loan at the analyst, he proposes
the loan amount l and the repayment L.
• The analyst decides whether to grant the loan.
• The entrepreneur decides whether to offer the analyst a hedge
contract. If he offers a contract, he chooses its terms S.
• The analyst decides whether to accept the contract. If he
accepts, he further decides whether to risk-analyze the en-
trepreneur’s project, i. e. to find out the project’s state de-
pendency Y˜ .
• The analyst decides how to draw up the state dependencies
Z˜ of the contract.
• The entrepreneur signs the contract and carries out the
project.
• t = 1: Nature “chooses” a state ω and with it a project
realization Y˜ (ω) and a contract liability Z˜(ω).
• If possible, payments flow. If Y˜ (ω) − Z˜(ω) < K, the en-
trepreneur files for bankruptcy which leads to costs of φU.
S) he must offer to make the analyst indifferent between risk-analysis and no risk-
analysis. As a result, one can summarize that debt mitigates the delegation problem
of risk analysis between entrepreneur and risk analyst.
Let us now extend the above game by assuming that L and l are chosen endoge-
nously: First, the entrepreneur may apply for a loan (determined by L and l)
from the risk analyst. Then, he may mandate the analyst to analyze his project
and write an appropriate contract (hence he enters the subgame of risk analysis
delegation as described in Figure 1). The analyst may accept or reject each pro-
posal. Furthermore, assume that the entrepreneur disposes of all market power.
If the analyst rejects him, he can apply for a loan at another risk analyst.22 Be-
cause the entrepreneur can now choose L and l, his space of moves is enlarged:
σU ∈ {L, l} × {S, † } with L, l, S ∈ R. The analyst can reject the loan and/or the
hedge contract, σB ∈ {, † } × {⊕,, † }, where  stands for accepting the loan.
In the following, the game described is called Game 2 (cf. Figure 4).
22 Note that the reason for rejection cannot be a low credit standing, as the entrepreneur’s
probability of default is public information. If his credit standing is low, he knows that no risk
analyst would grant the loan, so he does not need to apply.
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3.2 Sequential Equilibrium
Proposition 2 (Relocation of Expected Profits) Assume that F , cB, φU and
K are such that in Game 1 (without debt) expected profits of the risk analyst are posi-
tive ( E[ΠB]l=0,L=0 > 0, equilibrium is of type σ
∗
2). Then with the same exogenous pa-
rameters in Game 2 (allowing for debt), if the entrepreneur chooses l¯ ≤ E[ΠB]l=0,L=0
and S and L¯ such that l¯ = L¯−F(L¯), S = S(⊕B∼),(l¯,L¯) − L¯, then
E[ΠU]l=l¯ = E[ΠU]l=0 + l¯ and E[ΠB]l=l¯ = E[ΠB]l=0 − l¯.
If the entrepreneur chooses l¯ ≥ E[ΠB]l=0,L=0, then
E[ΠU]l=l¯ = E[ΠU]l=0 + E[ΠB]l=0. and E[ΠB]l=l¯ = 0.
According to Proposition 2, if the risk analyst’s expected profits are positive, an
increasing level of debt l lets them shrink, whereas those of the entrepreneur grow.
This is intuitive. Without the loan, the entrepreneur would have to oblige the
analyst by increasing S, otherwise no analysis would take place (σB=). Now if the
entrepreneur is indebted at the analyst, this already has a genuine incentive to help
the entrepreneur to avoid his bankruptcy. This is due to the interest-harmonizing
impact of debt. Because the entrepreneur understands this impact, he applies for
a loan at the analyst. In other words, he holds out the prospect of the positive
expected profits of the hedge contract for the analyst, but only after accepting the
loan. If the analyst rejects the loan, then the entrepreneur turns to another risk
analyst.
Proposition 3 (Categorization of Sequential Equilibria) Depending on the
exogenous parameters F , K, φU and cB, sequential equilibrium σ
∗
l = (σ
∗
l,U, σ
∗
l,B) is
in one of the four categories
σ∗l,0 with σ
∗
l,U = (l = 0, † ), σ∗l,B = † and E[ΠB] = 0;
σ∗l,1 with σ
∗
l,U = (l = 0, S(⊕B∼† )), σ
∗
l,B = ⊕ and E[ΠB] = 0;
σ∗l,2 with σ
∗
l,U = (l > 0, S(⊕B∼)), σ
∗
l,B = ⊕ and E[ΠB] = 0; or
σ∗l,3 with σ
∗
l,U = (l = 0, S(B∼† )), σ
∗
l,B =  and E[ΠB] = 0.
In σ∗l,0 (as in σ
∗
0), no contract between entrepreneur and analyst is reached, so there
is no need for harmonization of interests. In σ∗l,3 (as in σ
∗
3), the entrepreneur chooses
not to raise S +L until incentive compatibility is given, hence again nothing speaks
for l > 0. In σ∗l,1 (as in σ
∗
1), incentive compatibility is reached already with l = L = 0.
Only in σ∗l,3, the entrepreneur applies for a loan in order to lower delegation costs
by harmonizing interests with the analyst. Proposition 3 is visualized in Figure 5.
Because loans are advantageous in only one of the four types of equilibria, a remark
on the relevance of the results may be appropriate. From an economic point of view,
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Figure 5: Scope of Sequential Equilibria of Game 2
1
1
2
2
3
3
K
cB
↙ S(⊕B∼† )=∞
↙ S(⊕B∼)=∞
← S(B∼† )=∞
↖ E[ΠU]σl,2 = E[ΠU]σl,0
E[ΠU]σl,2 = E[ΠU]σl,1↗
Note: Like in Figure 3, Y˜ is exponentially distributed with µ = 3, and φU = 5. The area where
the entrepreneur risk-analyzes (σ∗U = ⊕) is backed gray. l is positive in the gray area between the
two curved black lines. In comparison with Figure 3, one can see that the gray area has expanded:
The possibility of a loan makes the performance of risk analysis more likely.
it is clear that not in all equilibria there is a use for loans. The reason is that only
one aspect of loans is considered—the harmonization of diverging interests. Other
important aspects, such as the raising of funds for investment, are not taken into
account.23 Of course, parameter constellations under which there is no scope for the
delegation of risk analysis are easy to think of. Analysis costs may be prohibitively
high (cB → ∞) or the initial bankruptcy probability of the entrepreneur may be
to low (K → 0). In these cases, the missing desirability of risk analysis inhibits
possible advantages of a loan. However, which type of equilibrium is most realistic
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depends on the parameter assignment (of F , K, φU and cB) that comes closest to
reality.
Remark 4 (Comparison of Equilibria) If the entrepreneur is allowed to apply
for a loan from the analyst, there are more parameter constellations that if he is not
allowed to. The delegation of risk analysis gains scope.
In other words, parameter constellations under which σ∗0 of σ
∗
3 are equilibria in
Game 1 (with σ∗B = , no analysis) may lead to equilibria of the type σ∗l,2 in
Game 2 (with l > 0 and σ∗B = ⊕, analysis). Delegation of risk analysis becomes
more likely. The reason is that delegation costs that may be prohibitively high in
Game 1 are lowered in Game 2. The opposite direction of change of equilibrium
is not possible. The parameter constellations under which σ∗l,1 and σ
∗
1 form the
equilibrium are identical. Therefore, the “area” in which risk analysis takes place
expands.24 Beyond these point, some further aspects are worth discussing.
(i) In our setting, the loan does not serve any funding purposes. This does not
seem to match reality. However, if we alternatively assume that the entrepreneur
needs additional funding in order to carry out the project, he has the choice between
debt from the capital markets and debt from the risk analyst. In this environment,
debt from the analyst has again the property of mitigating the delegation problem,
in addition to the funding property. With the same reasoning, we can analyze the
effect of colateral on the delegation problem. Because collateral curtails the potential
losses for the risk analyst, it worsens incentives. Therefore, the costs of collateral
for the entrepreneur may be higher and the optimal degree of collateral lower than
they would be in the absence of the delegation problem.
(ii) In the model, only the effects of a loan on the delegation problem are considered.
Alternatively, the problem of delegating risk management can also be mitigated if
the analyst provides share finance for the entrepreneur. Also shares increase the
counterparty risk to be considered by the analyst. One may ask whether share or
debt finance generate more incentives for the analyst. Unfortunately, the question
cannot be answerer from within our setting: In Item 2, p. 4, we have assumed
that financial contracts do not contain return contingencies, and share finance is, of
course, highly return contingent. In a modified setting, one might expect that also
share finance mitigates the delegation problem, albeit to a lesser degree.
(iii) Why does the analyst, paying cB, have access to information that the en-
trepreneur does not have? One may imagine that two types of information are
needed for risk management: general information about the capital markets that
23 The lack of disadvantages of debt is also the reason that the l of Proposition 3 is only a lower
bound for an optimal loan amount. A further increase of l leads neither to advantages nor to
disadvantages for entrepreneur or analyst.
24 For an illustration, compare Figure 3 with Figure 5. The gray area grows.
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costs a fixed C to acquire, and firm-specific information that costs cB. If C is
large, there are strong economies of scale, and some firms may want to specialize in
information-gathering in order to economize on these costs. Risk analysts emerge
endogenously. One may ask who is going to become a risk specialist. The answer
of our paper is that banks (lenders) will assemble this expertise, because they will
subsequently have lower delegation costs in comparison with potential competitors.
(iv) One might ask whether large or rather small firms delegate risk analysis. For
simplicity, assume that there is a “size” variable γ and that all monetary variables
concerning the enterprise (Y˜ , K and φU) are proportional to γ.
25 Then the answer
can be derived easily. The only variable left is cB, the costs of risk analysis. Choosing
γ as nume´raire, cB becomes inversely proportional to γ. A doubling of the firm’s size
γ has the same effect as a halving of the costs of risk analysis cB. Now assume that
cB is low (cB ≈ 0). The terms S∗ that make the analyst indifferent between ⊕ and 
are small (S∗ ≈ 0). Therefore, the entrepreneur does not need to oblige the analyst
by raising S∗ above the “fair” level in order to make him risk-analyze. There are
no delegation costs for the entrepreneur, and the first-best solution can be reached.
Hence large firms delegate risk analysis. They need not raise a loan in order to
reduce delegation costs. By contrast, γ ≈ 0 is equivalent to cB ≈ ∞, implying that
the entrepreneur does not delegate risk analysis. However, no monotonic relation
between e. g. expected profits of the risk analyst and size of the firm exist.26 In short,
large firms have no costs when delegating risk management. The fixed costs of risk
analysis imply economies of scale already in the first-best world without a delegation
problem. The above considerations—even if simplistic—suggest that economies of
scale are aggravated in the presence of the delegation problem.
(v) A property of Figures 3 and 5 can be generalized: Entrepreneurs with either
very high or very low credit standing do not delegate risk management (note that a
high K implies a high probability of bankruptcy F (K)). For entrepreneurs with a
low F (K), insuring their risk is not worthwhile. If F (K) is high, insurance of that
much risk is prohibitively costly. As a result, the clientele of banks is entrepreneurs
with a medium credit standing. 27
(vi) An important question is whether the risk analyst may be interpreted as a bank.
To be sure, the answer to this question depends on how narrow one defines the word
“bank”. If one regards the refinancing through illiquid deposits as the key property
of banks, the question remains unanswered by the model. If one defines banks as
firms that grant loans, the risk analyst surely is a bank. The question of how the
25 Of course, alternative assumptions, such as K growing more than proportionally with γ, or φU
growing less then proportionally with γ, may be even more plausible.
26 The reason is that an increase of the nume´raire γ has a positive direct effect on expected profits,
but lets cB and therewith E[ΠB] shrink. There are therefore two opposite effects of which none
strictly dominates the other.
27 For a formal discussion, see Proposition 7 (available on the author’s website).
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risk analyst is financed is not addressed in the model—it is assumed that the analyst
has sufficient funds to pay all obligations. It is legitimate to ask what changes if the
analyst has only limited funds and is himself threatened by bankruptcy. Assume
also that the analyst has access to credit markets in order to obtain additional fund-
ing, and to financial markets to reinsure the risk he incurs from the entrepreneur.
This complicates the model fundamentally, augmenting the number of players from
two to four. However, the basic properties of the model remain unchanged. The
entrepreneur, borrowing from the risk analyst, creates incentives for the analyst
to avert the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy, which in turn mitigates the costs of dele-
gating risk management.28 Yet another approach would be to assume that there
exist further market imperfections that typically entail the existence of banks, such
as costly state verification as in Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986) or Winton
(1995).29 In this case, it seems natural that it is the risk analyst who assumes the
task of delegated monitoring. That way, the problem of delegating risk management
is presumably mitigated again.30 Additionally in the setting of Williamson (1986),
the analyst can economize on monitoring costs.31
(vii) Note that the preceding results can be reinterpreted in a different manner. In
Game 1 (without loan), the constellations of parameters are such that in equilibrium,
the expected profits of the analyst are positive. In Game 2 (with the loan), the
entrepreneur has to cede part of his expected profits to the analyst in order to
satisfy incentive compatibility. Now Remark 3 states that it is irrelevant whether
incentive compatibility is achieved by higher terms S or by a loan repayment L
(which is linked to the loan amount l). One can define a different game which leads
to the same results. The entrepreneur auctions off the prospect of the contract. The
bidders are risk analysts. A risk analyst then bids as high as the future expected
payoffs of the hedge contract.32 In equilibrium, all expected cash flows are identical
to the ones of Game 2.
28 However, this mitigating effect may be stronger then in the benchmark case of this paper, as a
bankruptcy of the entrepreneur can have contagious effects on the solvency of the analyst. On
the other hand, it may also be weaker because of the analyst’s limited liability. The relative
size of these effects depends on the parameterization of the extended model.
29 Note that the sources of information asymmetry are primarily different in our paper and Dia-
mond (1984). There, ex post state verification is costly. Here, there is no ex post information
asymmetry. Ex ante, correlations are unobservable for the entrepreneur.
30 Still, one caveat may make delegated risk management for several entrepreneurs problematic.
Under certain circumstances, the risk analyst may be tempted to exploit his limited liability
and sell the entrepreneurs highly correlated hedging contracts, no matter what the correlation
of their projects is.
31 If he exerts cB and learns Y˜ , he can infer Y = Y˜ (ω) from the state of nature ω. He needs to
monitor only in the cases where the entrepreneur reports that the project return is less than
the (inferred) Y .
32 The auction’s mechanism (English, Dutch, Vickrey, First Price) is irrelevant if risk analysts
have the same information about the value of the future contract.
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
As shown, an agent that is able to obtain information about the correlations of risky
assets endogenously carries out risk analysis, risk controlling (thus risk management)
and grants loans, on behalf of a principal, an entrepreneur. The model suggests that
there are economies of scope between lending and risk management. It can therefore
be seen as one possible answer to the assertion of Allen and Santomero (1998) that
there is no cogent theory as to why banks should be the ones offering the service of
risk management.
Several simplifying assumptions allowed us to derive analytical results. The following
extensions seem desirable from an empirical point of view, but may render the
explicit analysis of the model more difficult.
(i) Unlike the entrepreneur, the risk analyst is not threatened by bankruptcy in the
model. This has two implications. First, the entrepreneur does not need to take the
risk analyst’s possible insolvency into consideration. As a result, the risk analyst
can easily insure any conceivable risk. Second, unlike a real bank, the risk analyst
has no intrinsic incentive to manage (own) risk. The incentive emerges extrinsically
from the entrepreneur’s delegation. As a possible extension of the model, one can
impose financial restrictions on the risk analyst. Because of potential bankruptcy,
the risk analyst then acts no longer risk neutrally. When risk sharing, he weighs up
his own against his customer’s interests. In case of conflict, the customer’s interests
may be neglected. Still, the risk analyst may create some value by bearing some of
the entrepreneur’s risk.
(ii) The entrepreneur’s initial probability of bankruptcy is exogenous. In reality,
it seems obvious that this probability can be influenced, e. g. by the way the en-
trepreneur operates his business. For example, the entrepreneur may be able to
agree upon different terms with his customers. The terms that his business partners
grant may in turn depend on the entrepreneur’s decision about whether to hedge
against bankruptcy risk.33 A possible extension of the model might consider the
reaction of the entrepreneur’s business partners on his hedging decision.
(iii) In the model, the risk analyst can choose between carrying out the risk analysis
or refrain from it.34 Alternatively, one may assume the risk analyst’s set of options
to be larger and smoother. He may then e. g. choose between different levels of effort
when carrying out the risk analysis.
33 The price a customer is willing to pay for a good may e. g. depend on the producer’s probability
of bankruptcy, especially if the good need future servicing. Even multiple equilibria might exist.
If an entrepreneur’s business partners—especially his lenders—believe that his credit worthiness
is high, they will demand only a low risk premium, which reduces the entrepreneur’s costs of
funds and thus his probability of bankruptcy. When they believe that the credit worthiness is
low, one can argue the other way round.
34 This causes the jumps in the expected profits functions of Figure 2.
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However, the idea that loans mitigate the delegation problem and therefore lenders
have comparative advantages in selling advice concerning risk management to their
lenders seems to be very robust regarding different assumptions. This paper is the
first to point out this possible function of banks.
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Technical Appendix for the Paper
“Banks as Delegated Risk Manager”
by Hendrik Hakenes
Proof of Remark 1: If the risk analyst draws up the fitting contract, he can expect35
E[ΠB](S,⊕) = E[Z˜]− cB =
∫
Ω
Z˜(ω) dPr{ω} − cB (15)
=
∫ ∞
0
min{S, Y −K} f(Y ) dY − cB
=
∫ S+K
0
(Y −K) f(Y ) dY +
∫ ∞
S+K
S f(Y ) dY − cB
= S F (S + K)−F(S + K) + (1− F (S + K))S − cB
= S −F(S + K)− cB. (16)
These expected profits are an upper bound for the possible expected profits of other contracts with
the same distribution,
E[ΠB] =
∫
Ω
min{Z˜(ω), Y˜ (ω)} dPr{ω} − cB ≤
∫
Ω
Z˜(ω) dPr{ω} − cB. (17)
Thus if the analyst draws up a contract at all, he selects the fitting contract. However, if the analyst
had chosen to enter into no contract at all, then he would have foreseen this before spending cB—
hence this cannot occur, if he acts rationally. 
Proof of Remark 2: We lead the proof for the case of finite Ω with P (ω) = 1/|Ω| for all ω ∈ Ω
only. We have thus an equal distribution on Ω. Arbitrary distributions can be approximated by
taking the limit |Ω| → ∞.36
Now be a function g : R→ R given such that the fitting (desirable) contract Z˜ has the form Z˜(ω) =
g(Y˜ (ω)). In the case of the model of Section 2.1, g(Y ) = min{S, Y −K}. Be G := {g(Y˜ (ω))|ω ∈ Ω}
the image set of g(Y˜ ), and γ : G → N, γ(z) := #{ω ∈ Ω|g(Y˜ (ω)) = z} the function that counts
how often a z ∈ G is hit.
Now the risk analyst, without gathering information about the state dependency of the project Y˜ ,
sets
Z˜π(ω) = g(Y˜ (π(ω)))
each Z˜π chosen with equal likelihood for each π ∈ ΠΩ, where ΠΩ is the set of permutations on Ω.
Hence, |ΠΩ| = |Ω|!. Then
P (Z˜ = z|ω) = γ(t) (|Ω| − 1)!|Ω|! = γ(z)/|Ω| and likewise
P (Z˜ = z|Y˜ (ω)) = γ(t)
2 (|Ω| − 1)!
γ(t) |Ω|! = γ(z)/|Ω|.
The same result one would get when assuming that Z˜(ω) = g(X˜(ω)), with X˜ i. i. d. of Y˜ . 
35 Let F (f) without index always stand for FY˜ (fY˜ ). Be F the primary function of F .
36 An arbitrary distribution function F can be approximated by assuming that Ω =
{1, . . . , N}, N ∈ N and setting Y˜ (i) = F−1( i−1/2N ).
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The derivation of eq. (5) is based on partial derivation.
E[ΠB](S,) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
min{Y,X −K,S} f(Y ) dY f(X) dX
=
∫ ∞
S+K
∫ ∞
S
S f(Y ) dY f(X) dX
+
∫ ∞
S+K
∫ S
0
Y f(Y ) dY f(X) dX
+
∫ S+K
K
∫ ∞
X−K
(X −K) f(Y ) dY f(X) dX
+
∫ S+K
K
∫ X−K
0
Y f(Y ) dY f(X) dX
+
∫ K
0
∫ ∞
0
(X −K) f(Y ) dY f(X) dX
= (1− F (S + K)) (1− F (S))S
+ (1− F (S + K)) (S F (S)−F(S))
+
∫ S+K
K
(1− F (X −K)) (X −K) f(X) dX
+
∫ S+K
K
((X −K)F (X −K)−F(X −K)) f(X) dX
−F(K)
= (1− F (S + K)) (S −F(S))
+
∫ S+K
K
((X −K)−F(X −K)) f(X) dX −F(K)
= (1− F (S + K)) (S −F(S)) + F (S + K)F(S)− (F(S + K)−F(K))
−
∫ S+K
K
F(X −K) f(X) dX −F(K)
= S −F(S + K)−
∫ S
0
F (X) (1− F (X + K)) dX,
which was to be shown. 
Proposition 4 (Indifference Points of the Risk Analyst) If the entrepreneur offers a con-
tract to the risk analyst, he proposes terms S so low that the risk analyst is indifferent between two
moves.
Proposition 4 implies that only a finite set of terms S needs to be considered. The point S(⊕B∼)
where the analyst is indifferent between a contract with analysis and a contract without, S(⊕B∼† )
where the analyst is indifferent between a contract with analysis and no contract at all, and S(B∼† )
where the analyst is indifferent between a contract without risk analysis and no contract.
Proof of Proposition 4: The assertion follows from the fact that the entrepreneur’s expected profits
decrease monotonically with S, for ∂E[ΠU](S,⊕)/∂S = F (S + K) − 1 < 0 and ∂E[ΠU](S,)/∂S =
(F (S) − 1 − φU f(S + K)) (1 − F (S + K)) < 0. Of course, ∂E[ΠU](S, † )/∂S = 0. Hence for every
move of the risk analyst σB ∈ {⊕,, † }, the entrepreneur preferably chooses S low, only restricted
by the risk analyst’s indifference points. 
Remark 5 (Existence and Uniqueness of Indifference Points) If an indifference point
S(⊕B∼) exists, it is unique, and for all S < S(⊕B∼), the analyst prefers not to carry out the
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risk analysis. If S(⊕B∼) does not exist, the analyst always prefers to carry out the risk analysis.
Analogous statements apply for S(⊕B∼† ) and S(B∼† ).37
Proof of Remark 5: The claim follows from the fact that
0 < 1− F (S + K)− F (S) (1− F (S + K)) < 1− F (S + K) =⇒
∂E[ΠB]( † , † )
∂S
<
∂E[ΠB](S,)
∂S
<
∂E[ΠB](S,⊕)
∂S
and inS = 0,
0 < −F(K) < −F(K) =⇒
E[ΠB]( † , † ) > E[ΠB](S=0,) > E[ΠB](S=0,⊕).
Hence, indifference points are unique, and if they fail to exist, the option preferred at S = 0 is
preferred everywhere. 
The proof of Proposition 1 draws on Remark 5. If the entrepreneur’s global optimum is (as
illustrated in Figure 2) reached with σ∗B = ⊕, then he implements S as small as possible. That
being so, either σ∗U = S(⊕B∼† ) with E[ΠB] = 0 or σ
∗
U = S(⊕B∼) with E[ΠB] > 0 holds. If σ
∗
B = ⊕
is optimal for the entrepreneur, then the lower bound of potential S is S(B∼† ). If no contract is
better than any contract, then the entrepreneur’s strategy will be σ∗U = † .38 
Proof of Proposition 5: In σ∗2 , the analyst is indifferent between ⊕ and , so
cB =
∫ S∗
0
F (X) (1− F (X + K)) dX. (18)
Differentiation of (18) subject to cB yields
1 = F (S∗) (1− F (S∗ + K)) ∂S
∗
∂cB
and thus
∂S∗
∂cB
=
1
F (S∗) (1− F (S∗ + K)) > 0. Analogously,
∂S∗
∂K
=
∫ S∗
0
F (X) f(X + K) dX
F (S∗) (1− F (S∗ + K)) > 0,
which was to be shown. 
Proof of Proposition 6:
E[ΠU] = E[Y˜ ]− S∗ + F(S∗ + K)
s. t. cB =
∫ S∗
0
F (X) (1− F (X + K)) dX, thus
∂E[ΠU]
∂K
= F (S∗ + K)− (1− F (S∗ + K)) ∂S
∗
∂K
= F (S∗ + K)− (1− F (S∗ + K))
∫ S∗
0
F (X) f(X + K) dX
F (S∗) (1− F (S∗ + K))
37 To be precise, if S(⊕B∼† ) (S(B∼† ) resp.) exists, it is unique, and for all S < S(⊕B∼† ) (S(B∼† )
resp.), the analyst prefers not to participate. If S(⊕B∼† ) (S(B∼† ) does not exist, the analyst
prefers not to participate (compared to participating and analyzing/not analyzing).
38 There are in fact more equilibria. However, the corresponding payments are equal those of
one of the four equilibria listed above. E. g., instead of playing σ∗U = † , the entrepreneur
can set S = 0, which implies E[ΠB] < 0. As a result, the analyst cannot possibly agree.
The equilibrium σ∗ = (σ∗U = 0, σ
∗
B = † ) is therefore considered as equivalent to σ∗0 = (σ∗U =
† , σ∗B = † ).
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which is negative if and only if
F (S∗ + K)F (S∗) <
∫ S∗
0
F (X) f(X + K) dX
= F (S∗)F (S∗ + K)−
∫ S∗
0
f(X)F (X + K) dX ⇐⇒
0 >
∫ S∗
0
f(X)F (X + K) dX,
which is a contradiction. Hence ∂E[ΠU]/∂K > 0 holds. Furthermore,
∂E[ΠU]
∂cB
= −(1− F (S∗ + K)) ∂S
∗
∂cB
< 0,
∂E[ΠB]
∂K
= −∂E[ΠU]
∂K
< 0 and
∂E[ΠB]
∂cB
= −∂E[ΠU]
∂cB
− 1
= (1− F (S∗ + K)) 1
F (S∗) (1− F (S∗ + K)) − 1 =
1
F (S∗)
− 1 > 0.
Obviously, ∂E[ΠB]/∂φU = ∂E[ΠU]/∂φU = 0. 
Having categorized the possible sequential equilibria, it is of interest to deduce how the endogenous
variables react to changes of exogenous parameters (comparative statics). In the following Propo-
sitions 5 and 6, we concentrate on equilibria of the form σ∗2 .
39 The entrepreneur can solve the
delegation problem and make the analyst inspect (σB = ⊕) only by obliging him through raising
the terms S to S⊕B∼. Intuitively, if cB is high, the entrepreneur must provide more incentives. If
K is high, he must pay more for the “insurance”.
Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics for S∗) Let F , K, φU and cB be such that in equilib-
rium, expected profits of the risk analyst are positive (equilibrium has the form σ∗2). Then
40
∂S∗
∂cB
> 0 and
∂S∗
∂K
> 0 (19)
The results of Proposition 5 can be used to analyze the expected profits’ dependence on exogenous
parameters.
Proposition 6 (Comparative Statics for EΠB and EΠU) Let F , K, φU and cB be such
that in equilibrium, expected profits of the risk analyst are positive (equilibrium has the form σ∗2).
Then
∂E[ΠB]
∂K
< 0,
∂E[ΠU]
∂K
> 0,
∂E[ΠB]
∂cB
> 0,
∂E[ΠU]
∂cB
< 0.
Furthermore, ∂E[ΠB]/∂φU = ∂E[ΠU]/∂φU = 0.
39 For the other types, comparative statics are trivial. E[ΠB] = 0 in any event, and ∂E[ΠU]/∂cB,
∂E[ΠU]/∂K and ∂E[ΠU]/∂φU are negative or vanish.
40 Note that if one of the variables changes too much, equilibrium may switch from σ∗2 to a
different type. Accordingly, the derived inequations apply only locally in the interior of σ∗2 .
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Nothing can be said about how the expected profits of the players react to changes of F in general.41
One of the results surprises at first sight. The risk analyst’s expected profits increase with the costs.
Intuitively, if the costs of risk analysis rise, the entrepreneur must raise the analyst’s counterparty
risk κ(S) and as a result S in order to keep the analyst indifferent between risk analysis and
randomizing. Proposition 6 shows that the effect of the rising S outweighs the effect of the higher
cB. Consequently, the analyst is overcompensated for his increasing costs.
Proposition 7 (Credit Standing of Analyzed Entrepreneurs) Given F , cB and φU, an en-
trepreneur with especially high or low credit standing does not offer the risk analyst a contract such
that this examines the project in equilibrium (hence equilibrium has the form σ∗1 or σ
∗
2).
42
Consequently, the customers of the analyst have a medium credit standing. For entrepreneurs with
a high standing, the costs of risk analysis (inclusive of delegation costs) are too high, compared
with potential gains when saving bankruptcy costs. Entrepreneurs with a very low standing cannot
afford a hedge contract, because the costs of insurance exceed expected profits.
Proof of Proposition 7: First note that because of F ’s monotonicity, a high (low) K is equivalent
to a high (low) initial bankruptcy probability and thus to a low (high) credit standing. If K
is low (K ≈ 0), then E[ΠU]† = E[Y˜ ] − φU F (K) ≈ E[Y˜ ]. If analyst and entrepreneur sign a
contract and the analyst risk-analyzes, then E[ΠB] + E[ΠU] = E[Y˜ ] − cB, thus E[ΠB] ≥ 0 implies
E[ΠU] ≤ E[Y˜ ]− cB. Risk analysis is too expensive for K ≈ 0. For the case of high K, note that
κ(S) =
∫ S
0
F (X) (1− F (X + K)) dX
≤ S F (S) (1− F (K)).
If Y˜ is integrable then S F (S) is bounded, and for high K and thus small 1− F (K), there is no S
with κ(S) = cB. Incentives are never sufficient to guarantee the analysis. 
Proof of Remark 3: Clearly, (8) remains unchanged when substituting L → 0 and S → S + L,
which proves (12). The same applies for (10), yielding (13). Hence concerning the indifference
point,
E[ΠB](S,⊕),(L,l) = E[ΠB](S,),(L,l) iff
E[ΠB](S+L,⊕),(0,l) = E[ΠB](S+L,),(0,l) iff
E[ΠB](S+L,⊕),(0,0) = E[ΠB](S+L,),(0,0) iff
S + L = S(⊕B∼),
thus S(⊕B∼),(L,l) = S(⊕B∼) − L, which was to be shown. 
Proof of Proposition 2: (14) implies that with raising L, S(⊕B∼),(L,l) is lowered by the same
amount. The sum S(⊕B∼),(L,l) + L remains constant, and as can be seen in (12) and (13), the
analyst’s expected profits stay constant. Because analysis takes place, also the entrepreneur’s
profits in (9) depend only on the sum S + L and stay unchanged. Thus only the change of l
affects expected profits, and as can be seen from (8) and (9), ∂E[ΠB]/∂l = −1 and ∂E[ΠU]/∂l = 1
if σU = ⊕. The condition l¯ = L¯ − F(L¯) guarantees that after granting the loan, analyst and
entrepreneur are still interested in achieving a hedge contract. 
41 This is due to the multidimensionality of F . If one e. g. assumes that log Y˜ is normally dis-
tributed, one can calculate ∂E[ΠU]/∂µ, ∂E[ΠU]/∂σ and so forth.
42 Figure 3 furnishes an illustration for Proposition 7. For fixed cB, the analyst risk-analyzes only
for medium K.
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The proof of Proposition 3 can be led analogously to that of Proposition 1. The entrepreneur
chooses S + L just large enough to guarantee the desired response of the analyst. A positive
E[ΠB] is impossible, because of Proposition 2, the entrepreneur would rather raise l and pocket
the expected profits himself.43 
We can now examine how the loan amount l reacts to changes in exogenous parameters (compar-
ative statics). Only the case σ∗l,2 is of interest, because in the other cases, we have l = 0.
Remark 6 (Comparative Statics for l) Let F , K, φU and cB be such that in equilibrium, the
amount of debt is positive (equilibrium has the form σ∗l,2). Then
∂l
∂K
< 0 and
∂l
∂cB
> 0.
Furthermore, ∂l/∂φU = 0.
Note that the analyst grants loans only to entrepreneurs with medium credit standing. This can
be derived directly from Proposition 7.
Proof of Remark 6: By Proposition 2, each additional monetary unit of l increases E[ΠU] and
decreases E[ΠB] by one unit. The rest can be derived by substituting E[ΠB]→ l Proposition 6. 
43 Analogously to Proposition 1 (as stated in Footnote 38), there are additional equilibria which
are equivalent to the ones listed above concerning payments.
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